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11. Introduction
It is widely recognised that commitment power, because it implies credibility, is often
needed for the government to implement its policies successfully.  In practice though,
most real-world governments may not be able to commit far into the future.  While this
has been a prominent issue in the macroeconomic literature on monetary policy1, the
relationship between government commitment power and successful policy intervention
has also been discussed in the context of microeconomic policy.  It is to this field of
microeconomic policy design that we hope to contribute with this paper.
The assumption that governments tend to lack long-run commitment power hardly needs
justification. Perhaps the most obvious reason for limited commitment power is a public
perception that a government is unstable or likely to succumb to the political pressures
exercised by powerful interest groups.  However, even governments that have managed
to acquire a reputation of “benevolent welfare maximisers” are often unable to commit to
policies in the longer run.  Beside the fact that democratically elected governments have a
mandate for a limited period of time only, the budgetary implications of their policies
tend to be reassessed regularly, often leading to a fine-tuning if not a complete
abandoning of some of the previously adopted policies.
This begs the question whether policy activism by a government with short-run
commitment power only, will be effective or whether it will be doomed to fail.  It
becomes clear that this is a pertinent question when one recognises that the ability to
commit to one’s actions matters not only for policy makers but also for private agents.
One important way through which firms especially can obtain commitment power is
through irreversible investment2. Irreversibility implies that, if firms invest before policy
is set, they commit to some of their actions before the government does.
The existing literature has treated the move order in games between government and
private sector players as exogenous.  Who moves first is determined by the relative
                                                
1 For instance, Kydland and Prescott (1977), Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992).
2 The strategic implications of the irreversibility of investment have been widely discussed in the industrial
2strength of the players’ commitment power.  If the government has long-run commitment
power (relative to the private sector), it can be called “autonomous” and is assumed to
move first, thus being able to induce the private sector to carry out the desired behaviour.
However, if it lacks long-run commitment power, it is assumed to move second and is
“subordinate” to private agents, who will try to shape policies to their own advantage 3.
Our paper deviates from this standard approach by viewing the move order of
government and private sector as the outcome of a game, rather than imposing it
exogenously4.  We demonstrate that who will lead –policy makers or firms- is
endogenous and results from the interaction of two real-world features that are
incorporated in our model.  First, as argued earlier, governments are unlikely to be able to
commit in the long run.  Second, in a world characterised by uncertainty, firms have to
decide when to make irreversible investment.  When firms invest early, they move before
policy makers and make the state “subordinate”.  However, early investment in a climate
of uncertainty reduces a firm’s flexibility.  Firms may therefore want to wait and choose
investment levels after having received more precise information about the profitability
of the market.  Investment delay, though it surrenders the ability to strategically alter
government policy, has the advantage of retaining flexibility (as argued in the option
value literature of investment)5.  When firms delay investment, the outcome of the game
entails the government moving first, acting as an “autonomous” state.  Importantly, we
demonstrate that a firm’s trade-off between committing early and remaining flexible will
be affected by the policy regime adopted by the government.  Hence, whether policy
                                                                                                                                                
organisation literature.  Tirole (1988) provides a textbook treatment of this issue.
3 The terms “autonomous” state and “subordinate” state were first suggested by Rodrik (1992) in a
development policy setting.  He contrasts the relatively autonomous Park regime in Korea with the earlier
more subordinate Rhee regime.  Under Park’s rule, most of the government’s decisions affecting business
were implemented, while this was not true under Rhee (based on survey evidence reported by Jones and
Sakong, 1980). In the political economy literature, private sector agents engage in “directly unproductive”
rent-seeking behaviour in order to manipulate “subordinate” governments (see, among many others,
Bhagwati (1982), Mayer (1984) and Grossman and Helpman (1994)).  In some models in the trade policy
literature, firms partially capture government policy by undertaking actions –such as choosing their
investment levels - prior to governments setting export subsidies (see, for instance, Grossman and Maggi
(1998) and Neary and Leahy (2000)).
4  There are several papers in the industrial organisation literature that endogenise the move order between
rival firms in oligopolistic industries (Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Spencer and Brander (1992), Sadanand
and Sadanand (1996)).  This literature, however, remains silent on endogenous leadership in games
between policy makers and firms.
5 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a discussion of the option value associated with investment delay.
3makers will “steer” firms in the desired direction or, vice versa, firms will manipulate
government policy, is endogenous in our set-up.
Turning to the more detailed characteristics of our model, we assume that, in the absence
of government intervention, production is not at the socially optimal level, due to market
failures or externalities; investment is efficient.  The government targets the production
inefficiency with an output subsidy or tax. However, the policy scheme creates a new
distortion if it encourages firms to forgo flexibility and invest early and socially
suboptimally in order to manipulate the subsidy; in the absence of active policy, firms
delay investment until uncertainty is resolved.
In our model, a direct attempt to counter a distortion can make things worse. This is
reminiscent of, but basically very different from Rodrik (1987).  He argues that
distortions that are created by optimising agents’ behaviour in the first place, cannot
simply be removed (and may even be exacerbated) by policies targeting that distortion by
acting directly on the relevant margin.  In his model, the reason why such policies fail is
that their desirable effects are offset by unanticipated behaviour of private agents6.  In our
paper, the reason why policy intervention may do more harm than good, is essentially
different.  The policy scheme always corrects the initial distortion, but creates a new,
possibly more damaging one.  This distortion arises not because the government is
myopic; policy makers have, in fact, perfect foresight.  Neither does it occur because the
government has insufficient policy instruments at its disposal.  As we will argue, the
structural cause for the new distortion lies in the effect of the policy scheme, employed
by a government with short-run commitment power only, on the firms’ trade-off between
strategic commitment and flexibility.
Our set-up lends itself to a wide spectrum of microeconomic applications, including
environmental policy aimed at reducing pollution, trade policy designed to boost
                                                
6 Although discussed in a microeconomic policy framework, Rodrik’s argument echoes the Lucas critique
of macroeconomic policy.
4domestic firms’ share in key international markets, and development policy initiatives
geared towards improving economic efficiency.
In section 2, we describe the general model with a single firm.  Section 3 briefly
discusses the first-best benchmark.  The game between the government and the firm is
solved in section 4.  Section 5 compares welfare levels under non-intervention and the
active policy regime of a government with short-run commitment power.  In section 6,
the model is extended to oligopolistic industries.  Section 7 concludes by pointing out the
policy lessons that can be drawn from our analysis.
2. The model
Consider a monopolist firm in a set-up with two periods. In the first period, there is
uncertainty about the firm’s demand, which is resolved at the start of period two 7.  The
demand function is given by ),( uQp  where p and Q respectively stand for market price
and output.  Denoting partial derivatives by subscripts, we have 0<Qp .  The demand
function has a stochastic component, u, defined over the interval ],[ uu  with mean zero
and variance 2s . A positive u represents a positive demand shock, hence 0>up .
Revenue is denoted by pQuQR =),( .  We assume that a positive demand shock raises
the firm’s marginal revenue ( 0>QuR )
8.  The firm chooses both when and how much to
invest; it sets its investment level (k) either in period one, when future demand is
uncertain, or in period two, when demand is known, i.e., when u is observed.  Production
always takes place in period two, after uncertainty has been resolved.  The firm is
assumed to be risk neutral9.
The firm’s total costs depend on output and investment, and are given by
)(),(),( kCkQCkQC IP += , with PC  and IC  denoting production costs and investment
                                                
7 The model yields the same qualitative results with cost uncertainty.
8 In a very different model with demand uncertainty, Brander and Lewis (1986) label 0>QuR  as the
“normal” case.
9 Risk aversion complicates the analysis significantly without changing the qualitative nature of our results.
5costs, respectively.  Marginal production costs are positive ( 0>= PQQ CC ) and non-
decreasing ( 0³= PQQQQ CC ).  Importantly, investment is assumed to reduce both the
production cost ( 0<PkC ) and the marginal cost of production ( 0<=
P
QkQk CC ).
Furthermore, the marginal investment cost is positive ( 0>IkC ).  The total cost function is
strictly convex in k ( 0>+= Ikk
P
kkkk CCC ) and has an interior minimum.  So, for every
level of production, there is an investment level that minimises total costs (i.e., at which
0=kC ), denoted by )(
min Qk  and henceforth referred to as the “efficient” investment
level.  Thus, 0<kC  for )(
min Qkk < , in which case we will say that the firm
underinvests.  Similarly, if 0>kC , the firm overinvests ( )(
min Qkk > )10.
The firm’s profits, p , are
sQCR +-=p (1)
The production subsidy (which can be positive or negative), s, is set by the government in
order to maximise welfare, W, given by
G+-= sQW p (2)
Note that the government’s objective function differs from profits in two respects.  First,
expression (2) contains profits net of subsidy costs (instead of gross profits).  Second,
production potentially generates social benefits or costs other than net profits, denoted by
)(QG=G .  For instance, if output is consumed domestically, G  includes consumer
surplus.  If G  consist of consumer surplus only, then 0>GQ  and, provided demand is not
too convex, 0>GQQ
11.  In addition, G  may include production externalities.  If the good
is not consumed domestically and causes a negative externality (e.g., pollution), then
0<GQ , while QQG  is typically negative.
The firm and the government play a two-period three-stage game, which is depicted in
Figure 1.  In period one, the firm either sets its investment level if it chooses to invest
                                                
10 This terminology is commonly used in the literature on strategic investment (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988).
11 More specifically, if G consists of consumer surplus only, then 0>GQQ  if 0<+ QQQ Qpp .
6early, or decides to delay investment until period two (if the firm delays investment, it
chooses its investment level in stage three, simultaneously with output) 12.  In period two,
the government determines the subsidy (stage two). This reflects the government’s
inability to commit long-term.  Why is this so?  Suppose the government were,
nonetheless, to announce its policy in period one.  Since firms are aware of the fact that
the government cannot guarantee that there will be no subsidy readjustments in period
two, they would rightly perceive the policy announced in period one as “cheap talk” and
hence ignore it.  In short, any government attempt to set its output subsidy policy earlier
than in period two is bound to fail.  The government’s limited credibility forces it to
determine its policy in period two 13.  This is, nevertheless, not without advantages: unlike
policy set in period one, the policy will now be chosen with full knowledge of demand.
[Figure 1 about here]
3. The first-best benchmark
Before solving the game, it proves useful to determine the first-best outcome.  This gives
us a benchmark against which the outcome of the endogenous timing game can be
assessed.  Using expression (1), expression (2) can be rewritten as G+-= CRW .  The
first-order conditions for socially optimal output and investment are obtained by
maximising W  (after u is observed) and are given by:
0=G+-= QQQQ CRW (3)
0=-= kk CW (4)
Proposition 1 summarises these conditions.
                                                
12 Although in the real world it is more realistic to have capital chosen before output, game-theoretically
speaking it makes no difference whether the delaying monopolist firm chooses k  prior to or simultaneously
with output; so, there is no need to model the delaying firm’s capital choice and its output choice
sequentially.  When we extend the model to include a second firm in section 6, the outcomes do depend on
whether delaying firms choose k  prior to or simultaneously with output.  We then assume that delaying
firms choose k  prior to output, implying that the game then consists of four stages.
13 By contrast, a government with long-run commitment power is able to commit to an output subsidy
policy set in period one.  Setting the output subsidy in period one has, however, the drawback that it is
based on expected, not actual demand (see Dewit and Leahy (2004) for a discussion of the optimal policy
of a government with long-run commitment power in a trade policy framework).
7Proposition 1: The first-best is characterised (i) by a production level at which the
marginal social net benefit is equal to zero ( 0=G+- QQQ CR ) and (ii) by efficient
investment ( 0=kC ).
4. The endogenous timing game
We now solve the game in Figure 1.  Output is chosen in the last stage of the game.
When choosing its production level, the firm maximises its profits in period two, which
yields the first-order condition:
0=+-= sCR QQQp (5)
The equilibrium subsidy and the firm’s investment level will depend on whether the
monopolist delays or invests early.  Before showing how a policy active government
affects the firm’s equilibrium investment timing, we start with a brief discussion of the
firm’s investment timing when faced with a policy inactive government.
4.1. The firm’s investment timing under laissez-faire
Suppose the government is not policy active.  Equilibrium output is then given by
expression (5), setting s equal to zero.  If the firm delays investment, it maximises profits
with respect to k in period two, which implies 0=kC .  Hence, the firm’s investment
level is efficient. By contrast, if the firm invests early, it maximises expected profits in
period one, choosing the efficient investment level for expected demand only: 0=kEC ;
unlike with delay, investment is not chosen optimally for actual demand. So, ed pp ³  for
all values of u, and thus ed EE pp ³ , with d and e denoting investment delay and early
investment, respectively (these superscripts will henceforth be used to denote the firm’s
investment-timing choice). Therefore, without government intervention the firm always
adopts a “wait-and-see” approach and delays investment at all levels of uncertainty14.
4.2. The firm’s investment timing under the policy regime
We now allow the government to be policy active and derive the firm’s capital and the
government’s subsidy choice when the firm delays investment and when it invests early,
8respectively (output is always determined by (5)).  We then discuss when the firm
decides to invest and show that the existence of the policy regime creates the possibility
that the firm invests early.
4.2.1. Investment delay
If the firm delays investment, it chooses its investment level after the government has set
the subsidy.  Hence, the firm maximises profits in period two, taking the subsidy as
given.  The first-order condition for k is then 0=kp , implying:
0=kC (6)
When setting the subsidy, the government maximises welfare (see expression (2)), taking
into account how the firm’s output and investment levels will react to the subsidy.  This
yields the following first-order condition:
0=++
ds
dk
W
ds
dQ
WW
d
k
d
Qs (7)
with 0=-= QW ss p  (since Qs =p ), sW QQQ -G+= p  (with 0=Qp  from expression
(5)) and 0=-== kkk CW p (from expression (6)).  The optimal subsidy when investment
is delayed is thus given by:
Q
ds G= (8)
The sign of the subsidy depends on that of the marginal social benefit of production
(other than marginal industry profits), with 0>ds  if 0>GQ  and 0<
ds  if 0<GQ .
4.2.2. Early investment
If the firm invests early, it chooses its investment level before the government has set the
subsidy.  Solving by backward induction, we determine the government’s subsidy, taking
into account how output will respond to the subsidy, but taking the firm’s investment
level as given.  The first-order condition for welfare maximisation is then:
0=+
ds
dQ
WW
e
Qs (9)
                                                                                                                                                
14 At certainty, the firm is indifferent between delaying and investing early.
9Since 0=sW  and sW QQ -G= , the optimal subsidy when the monopolist chooses capital
in the first period, es , is given by:
Q
es G=  (10)
Note that the expression for the optimal subsidy takes the same form as with investment
delay (see expression (8)).  But, since QG  depends on output and there is no reason to
believe that output levels with delay and early investment are the same, subsidy levels are
likely to differ.
In period one, when choosing its investment level, the firm maximises expected profits,
yielding the following first-order condition for k :
0=ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
++=
dk
ds
dk
dQ
E
dk
d
E
e
s
e
Qk ppp
p
(11)
Since 0=Qp  (see expression (5)), we have ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-=
dk
ds
EE
e
sk pp .  With kk C-=p  and
Qs =p , expression (11) reduces to
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
=
dk
ds
QEEC
e
k (12)
implying that the firm’s capital investment is not socially efficient.  Whether the firm
over- or underinvests given expected output, depends on how k affects the subsidy.  The
expression for dkds e /  (derived in Appendix A) is given by:
QQQQQQ
QkQQ
e
CR
C
dk
ds
G+-
G
= (13)
Since 0<QkC  and the second-order conditions for the government’s maximisation
problem require 0<G+- QQQQQQ CR , the sign of dkds
e /  is directly determined by the
sign of QQG .  The firm strategically underinvests ( 0<kEC ) if the subsidy falls in k
( 0/ <dkds e  if 0<GQQ ).  Conversely, when k raises the subsidy ( 0/ >dkds
e  if
0>GQQ ), the firm strategically overinvests ( 0>kEC ).  A comparison of expressions
(12) and (6) indicates how the firm’s capital choice is different with delay than with early
10
investment.  Unlike with investment delay, with early investment k cannot be chosen to
minimise costs, because it is set before actual demand is observed; nor is k chosen to
minimise expected costs, as it is set strategically to manipulate es .
4.2.3. Investment delay versus early investment
We explain the firm’s investment-timing choice under policy intervention in two steps.
First, we discuss the investment-timing outcome at certainty (i.e., at 02 =s ).
Subsequently, we study how uncertainty affects when the firm will invest.
Figures 2a and 2b show the firm’s capital reaction function and the government’s subsidy
reaction function in (k,s)-space at certainty.  (At every point in the diagram, the firm
chooses output to maximise profits, i.e. 0=Qp .)  The figures illustrate the difference
between the outcome of the game when the firm invests early and when it delays
investment. In both diagrams, the firm’s reaction function, )(sk  (along which 0=kC ), is
positively sloped: the firm’s cost-minimising investment level rises in the subsidy.  The
firm’s isoprofit contours are shown as solid curves, with profits increasing as one moves
to the right in the diagrams.  The government’s best response function is represented by
)(ks  (along which Qs G= ).  Isowelfare curves are depicted by complete dashed contours,
with the highest welfare level represented by point d.  We assume that )(ks  cuts )(sk
only once and –ensuring reaction function stability- that the absolute value of the slope
of )(ks  is greater than that of )(sk .  In Figure 2a, we illustrate the case in which the
marginal social benefit of production (other than profits) is positive ( 0>GQ ), implying
0>s , and increasing ( 0>GQQ ), implying that the slope of )(ks  is positive.  Figure 2b
depicts the case in which 0<GQ , implying 0<s , and 0<GQQ , implying 0/ <dkds
15.
[Figures 2a and 2b about here]
With investment delay, the firm’s chosen investment level lies on its best response
function.   Moving first, the government picks point d, the point on the firm’s reaction
11
function associated with the highest welfare level (at this point Q
ds G=  (see expression
(8); hence, point d also lies on the government’s reaction function).  When the firm
invests early, it selects the point on the government’s reaction function that yields the
highest profit (i.e., point e).  Compared to delay, both the firm’s investment level and the
subsidy differ from their levels with early investment.
Proposition 2: At certainty, under the policy regime, if the G-function is
(i) strictly convex ( 0>GQQ ), then 
de kk > and de ss > ;
(ii) strictly concave ( 0<GQQ ), then 
de kk < and de ss > ;
(iii) linear ( 0=GQQ ), then 
de kk = and de ss = .
Proof: See Appendix B.
When the marginal social benefit from production (other than industry profit) increases in
Q ( 0>GQQ ), the firm strategically overinvests when it sets k early, in order to obtain a
higher subsidy.  However, when 0<GQQ , early investment is characterised by strategic
underinvestment and a higher subsidy than with investment delay.  Part (i) and (ii) of
proposition 2 are respectively illustrated in Figure 2a and 2b.  Note that, when 0<GQ ,
production is taxed ( 0<s ).  Finally, only when the government’s subsidy does not
respond to the firm’s investment level, are investment and subsidy levels the same,
irrespective of the firm’s investment timing.
Early investment, enabling the firm to manipulate the subsidy through over- or
underinvestment, results in a higher subsidy.  Hence, under the active policy regime –at
certainty-, unlike under laissez faire, the firm obtains higher profits when investing early
than when delaying.
Proposition 3: At certainty, de pp ³  under the policy regime.
Proof: See Appendix B.
                                                                                                                                                
15 Obviously, other possible cases are 0>GQ  with 0<GQQ , and 0<GQ  with 0>GQQ .  For brevity, we
omit the figures for these cases.
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So, at certainty the firm will invest early under the policy regime.  The introduction of
uncertainty ( 02 >s ) does not necessarily change the firm’s investment-timing choice16.
In fact, by continuity, there will be a range of uncertainty in which the monopolist invests
early ( de EE pp > ).  So, the very presence of the subsidy scheme generates an incentive
for early investment that was absent under laissez-faire.
Corollary 1: If de pp >  at certainty, there exists a range of uncertainty for which the
firm invests early under the policy regime.
4.3. Welfare
In this subsection we investigate what the policy regime implies for welfare.  First-best
output and investment are given by expressions (3) and (4).  Since 0=Qp  (from (5)), we
have sCR QQ -=- .  Substituting this into (3) implies Qs G= .  The conditions Qs G=  and
0=kC  are identical to those derived in the case in which the firm delays investment until
period two.  Hence, dEW  is equal to expected welfare in the first-best outcome.  When
the firm invests early, the subsidy is Q
es G=  (and thus 0=G+- QQQ CR ). However,
investment is –even at certainty- not set at the efficient level (see (12)).  This implies that
a new distortion is created and the first-best is not reached.  These results are summarised
in proposition 4 and corollary 2.
Proposition 4: Under the policy regime, the welfare obtained is the first-best level,
provided that the firm delays investment.
Corollary 2: Under the policy regime, expected welfare with investment delay is at least
as high as with early investment ( ed EWEW ³ ); if 0¹GQQ , then 
ed EWEW > .
Note that, even if the government were to have a whole array of other policy instruments
at its disposal, the first-best would not be reached (except in the case in which firms
delay).  Investment subsidies (or taxes), for instance, will fail in preventing new
                                                
16 One can use Figures 2a and 2b only to compare the deterministic components of profits and welfare.  The
diagrams are not suited to discuss the additional benefits of flexibility under uncertainty.
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distortions being created17.  Instead, the first-best policy package calls for an instrument
that deters early investment.  However, such a policy instrument tends to require long-run
commitment power, which is precisely what the type of government discussed here
lacks18.
We have established that when the firm invests early under the policy regime, welfare
falls below the first-best level.  This does, however, not justify a general advocacy of
laissez faire as a superior policy stance to government intervention.  Obviously, the first-
best will not be reached under the laissez-faire regime either (unless 0=GQ
19), since then
the initial output distortion will remain.  When neither laissez faire nor the policy regime
gives rise to the first-best outcome, it is impossible to rank these two outcomes in the
general model.  In the next section, we explore the factors that determine which of these
outcomes qualifies as the second-best.  In order to do this, we need to turn to specific
functional forms.
5.  Laissez faire versus policy
The general model suggests some further questions.  First, under the policy regime, what
specific factors determine whether a firm invests early or delays?  This question is
important since it is only when the firm delays investment until after the output subsidy is
set that policy can guarantee the first-best (see proposition 4 and corollary 2).  Second, if
policy fails to achieve a first-best welfare level by inducing early investment, would the
laissez faire alternative attain an outcome that is socially preferred to the one realised by
the policy regime? Even though the government cannot commit in the long run to its
policies, it may be able to “buy” a specific commitment to non-intervention by
subscribing to international agreements that explicitly prohibit active policy.  Examples
                                                
17 There is no more reason to assume that a government with short-run commitment power only, could
commit to an investment subsidy in the long run, than that it could commit to an output subsidy.  Even if it
could, this would not alter the fact that capital under early investment is inflexible and not chosen in line
with actual demand.
18 Dewit and Leahy (2004) discuss how and when a government with long-run commitment power may
want to deter early investment in a trade policy context.
19 An example in which 0=GQ  is the special case of a monopolist firm exporting all its output without
generating any production externalities.
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are preferential trade agreements, economic integration agreements, international
agreements that prohibit state aid to firms and the free trade agreement of the WTO20.
Turning to specific functional forms to answer the above questions, assume demand is
given by:
uQap +-= (14)
and the firm’s total cost function is:
rkQkcC +-= )( 0 q with 0>q  and 0>r (15)
Production costs are Qkc )( 0 q- , with 0c  a positive constant and q  the effectiveness of
investment in reducing the marginal costs of production.  Investment costs are rk.  The
cost function in (15) satisfies the restrictions in the general model: total costs depend both
on output and investment, are convex in k and marginal production costs fall in k.  It
proves useful to define 02/2 >º rqh , denoting the “relative effectiveness” of
investment; h measures how effective investment is in reducing marginal production
costs relative to the cost of the investment.  We further assume that the social benefits
from production (other than profits) are given by:
2
0 )2/( QQ ee +=G (16)
with QQ ee +=G 0 , denoting the marginal social benefit of production that is not captured
by profits, and with e=GQQ ; the parameters 0e  and e  can be positive, negative or zero.
The expressions for output, investment and subsidy levels, expected profits and expected
welfare are reported in Table A.1 of Appendix C.    
Under what circumstances will policy yield the first-best outcome for society?  From
proposition 4, we know that answering this question requires identifying the factors that
cause the firm to delay investment in the presence of policy intervention.  While retaining
flexibility is clearly more important the greater the uncertainty, the value of early
                                                
20 The superiority of laissez faire to intervention has been debated in alternative, more specific set-ups in
the trade policy literature.  In a strategic trade policy model, Grossman and Maggi (1998) show that free
trade can be superior to a strategic export policy for the country.  Staiger and Tabellini (1999) find evidence
that GATT rules helped the US government to make domestic trade policy commitments that it could not
have made in the absence of these rules.
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investment increases if the scope for subsidy manipulation is greater.  Let 2sˆ  denote the
critical level of uncertainty at which the firm under the active policy regime is indifferent
between early investment and retaining flexibility through investment delay (i.e., 2s  at
which de EE pp = ).  Above this threshold ( 22 sˆs > ), the firm delays ( de EE pp < ),
while it invests early ( de EE pp > ) below it ( 22 sˆs < ).  In Figure 3a, 2sˆ  is shown as a
function of e  (at 00 =e  and 1.0=h )
21.  We see that 2sˆ  increases both as e  rises above
and falls below zero22; both larger positive and more negative values for e  raise the
value of strategic subsidy manipulation associated with early investment relative to the
flexibility value of investment delay23. This is because the possibility for subsidy
manipulation depends on dkds e / , which in turn depends crucially on e=GQQ .  The
parameter h  affects the critical uncertainty threshold at which a firm is indifferent
between investing early and investment delay in a similar way.  An increase in h raises
the relative effectiveness of investment, boosting output and hence the subsidy, giving the
firm a stronger incentive for strategic investment. The upward sloping 2sˆ -locus is
depicted in ( hs ,2 )-space in Figure 3b (at 00 =e  and 1=e )
24.    For 22 sˆs >  (area I in
Figures 3a and 3b), the firm delays and active policy will yield the first-best welfare
level.  For 22 sˆs <  (areas IIa and IIb in Figures 3a and 3b), the firm invests early and the
first-best cannot be attained.
[Figures 3a and 3b about here]
Having established when policy will achieve the first-best outcome, we now turn our
attention to the area below 2sˆ , in which the first-best cannot be reached.  As argued
earlier, high values of either e  or h give the firm a stronger incentive for socially
                                                
21 Figures 3a to 4c are normalised by setting 10 =- ca .
22 Note that at 0=e , the firm does not strategically invest ( de kk = ) because it cannot affect the subsidy
( 0/ =dkds e ).
23 Note that an increase in 0e  (the constant term in the G -function) shifts the 
2sˆ -locus up on either side of
the origin.  Ceteris paribus, an increase in 0e causes a larger change in output when the firm invests early
than when it delays (provided that 0¹e ).  This will lead to more strategic overinvestment if 0>e  and
more strategic underinvestment if 0<e , both causing a higher degree of subsidy manipulation.
24 So, 2/2Q=G , which corresponds to the case in which G  consists of consumer surplus only.
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suboptimal early investment.  While this benefits the firm, it renders intervention less
socially beneficial relative to laissez faire.  Both in Figures 3a and 3b, laissez faire and
intervention with early investment yield the same welfare level along the locus that is
denoted by w  and that demarcates areas IIa and IIb; laissez faire is socially preferred to
intervention ( )()0( esEWsEW >= ) at high values of e  and h  (area IIb), while the
opposite is true when e  and h  are small  (area IIa)25.  In the diagrams, each area is
labelled with the best attainable outcome from a social perspective.  For instance, in area
I (above 2sˆ ), policy intervention is preferred.  In area IIa, policy intervention with early
investment is the constrained social optimum, while laissez faire is the constrained social
optimum in area IIb.  Shaded labels indicate the areas in which intervention is the socially
preferred policy stance.
6. Extension: Oligopoly
We now extend our analysis to the case in which there are multiple firms.  For simplicity
and because it fully captures the intuition for the multiple-firm case, we examine the case
of two firms.  Two symmetric firms produce identical products and behave à la Cournot.
Demand is given by expression (14) (with 21 qqQ +=  and with 2,1=iq  denoting firm
output) while the cost function for each firm is represented by expression (15) (replacing
Q  by iq  and k by ik ).  Furthermore, to cut down on the taxonomy and to facilitate easy
diagrammatic comparison with monopoly, we assume 00 =e  and 1=e  in expression
(16) (i.e., 2/2Q=G , which is simply consumer surplus).  Then, since 0>GQ , the policy
active government will choose a positive subsidy.  The game now consists of four stages.
If a firm delays, it chooses its investment in period two, but prior to setting output.
Period two then consists of three stages: the government sets the subsidy in stage 2, firms
that delay investment chose their capital level in stage 3 and outputs are set in stage 4
(see also footnote 12).
                                                
25 An increase in 0e  shifts the w-locus to the right.  In other words, it raises the merits of the active policy
regime relative to laissez faire.  The main effect of an increase in 0e  is that it worsens the initial output
distortion, which raises the returns to policy intervention (admittedly –see footnote 23- it will also cause
more subsidy manipulation, but this effect is secondary).
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With two firms, there are four possible investment-timing combinations: both firms
invest early, ),( ji ee , both delay investment, ),( ji dd , and one firm invests early while the
other delays, ),( ji de , with ji ¹ .  Again, before turning to firms’ investment timing
under the policy regime, we first discuss investment-timing outcomes under laissez faire.
Unlike under monopoly, a firm may, even under laissez faire, invest early.  Figure 4a
shows firms’ investment-timing outcomes under laissez faire in ( hs ,2 )-space. While
both firms will delay if uncertainty is sufficiently high (area I in Figure 4a), at relatively
low levels of uncertainty investment leadership prevails (area II)26.  In order to explain
the emergence of investment leadership, we must examine firms’ investment-timing
decisions.  A firm’s incentive to invest early depends on its rival’s investment timing.
Given rival delay, a firm faces a trade-off between early investment and delay, even
without government intervention.  If it invests early, committing to capital in period one,
it benefits from the first-mover advantage associated with investment leadership.
However, early commitment implies a loss in flexibility, which becomes larger as the
level of uncertainty in period one rises.  Hence, early investment will be chosen at low
levels of uncertainty, whereas delay will be preferred as the uncertainty level exceeds a
critical threshold.  Given rival commitment, however, there is no trade-off between early
investment and investment delay.  Given that its rival’s capital is irrevocably fixed at a
specific level, firm i will neither gain strategically by committing in period one nor lose
strategically by delaying investment.  However, it will be more flexible if it delays.  This
implies that early investment by both firms cannot, except at certainty, be an equilibrium
under laissez faire27.  In fact, given rival commitment, a firm will assume the role of
investment follower under non-intervention.
[Figures 4a and 4b about here]
                                                
26 In the literature, leadership is found as the outcome of endogenous timing games when firms compete in
quantity and moving early implies “action commitment” (i.e., timing and level of the quantity variable –
such as output or investment- are chosen as a single action).  See, for instance, theorem VII in Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990) and Sadanand and Sadanand (1996).  Importantly, neither of these papers considers the
effect of policy (with or without long-run commitment) on firms’ timing choices.
27 Both ),( ji de  and ),( ji ee  are equilibria at 0
2 =s .  However, even a minute degree of uncertainty
would cause ),( ji ee  to collapse as an equilibrium.
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Next, we discuss firms’ investment timing under the policy regime, in which the
government sets the production subsidy for the industry.  The subsidy level depends on
the investment-timing outcome, with ddeddeee EsEsEsEs >=> ; at certainty, firm i’s
profit ranking is ddi
de
i
ed
i
ee
i pppp >>> , implying that, at 0
2 =s , each firm will always
invest early, irrespective of the rival’s timing ( dei
ee
i pp >  and 
dd
i
ed
i pp > ) (the first and the
second superscript refer to firm i’s and firm j’s investment-timing, respectively). Hence,
at certainty, the investment-timing outcome ),( ji ee  is the unique equilibrium.  Note that,
in spite of the fact that both firms strategically overinvest, they are not in a prisoner’s
dilemma type of situation.  In fact, each firm benefits not only from its own
overinvestment but also from its rival’s: both firms’ strategic investment forces the
government into setting a higher subsidy.  Figure 4b depicts the investment-timing
outcomes with policy intervention in ),( 2 hs -space.  The main point is that, unlike with
laissez faire, for 02 >s , ),( ji ee  is the unique investment-timing equilibrium even when
uncertainty is quite high28.
In Figure 4c, the socially preferred policy stance –intervention or laissez faire- is shown
for the different demarcated areas (again, shaded labels indicate the areas in which policy
intervention yields higher welfare than laissez faire).  Under duopoly, the critical
uncertainty level above which all firms in the industry delay (i.e., the locus separating
area I and II in Figure 4c) is lower than under monopoly ( 2sˆ  in Figure 3b).  Furthermore,
although, like under monopoly, intervention is preferable for low values of h (see areas
I, IIa, IIIa and IVa) and laissez faire is better for high values of h (see areas IIb, IIIb and
IVb), with duopoly, intervention is socially superior to laissez faire for a wider h-range
than with monopoly (note that, with intervention, there are two equilibria in area II; in
area IIb intervention is preferable to laissez faire only if both firms delay, while
intervention is always superior to laissez faire in area IIa).  Hence, the region in which
policy intervention is superior to laissez faire is larger under duopoly than under
                                                
28 As Figure 4b shows, delay by both firms can also be an equilibrium but only at very high levels of
uncertainty.
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monopoly.  This can be easily seen from comparing Figures 3b and 4c: the areas with the
shaded labels added together are (corrected for the different scales used in the diagrams)
much larger in Figure 4c than in Figure 3b.
So why is it that, at certain combinations of 2s  and h, the policy regime is inferior to
non-intervention under monopoly, while the opposite is true under oligopoly?  This is
explained by the fact that the subsidy is relatively less responsive to changes in
investment if the industry is oligopolistic.  There are two reasons for this.  First, a change
in industry output has a smaller impact on the subsidy under duopoly than under
monopoly; because of the larger number of competitors under oligopoly, the output
distortion in oligopolistic industries is smaller than the one in monopolistic sectors.
Second, an individual firm’s ability to manipulate industry output through its investment
is smaller in the presence of competitors.  In Cournot duopoly, a firm’s output expansion
induced by additional investment ( 0/ >ii dkdq ) is accompanied by a cut-back in its
rival’s production ( 0/ <ij dkdq ), which dampens the effect of the firm’s investment on
industry output; hence, 0// >> iii dkdQdkdq .  By contrast, an output expansion by a
monopolist is –by definition- reflected in an industry output expansion of the same size.
In short, a weaker ability of the individual firm to influence industry output (through its
investment) on the one hand, and a lower responsiveness of the government subsidy to
industry output on the other hand, gives a firm under duopoly a weaker incentive to
manipulate the government, leading to a smaller strategic distortion and thus causing the
policy regime to be less harmful than under monopoly.  In fact, as the number of firms in
the industry goes up, the distortionary effects of policy intervention become smaller
because the individual firm’s incentive to manipulate the subsidy is increasingly
weakened.
[Figure 4c about here]
Two important insights emerge from studying the multiple-firm case.  First, in order to
manipulate government policy more successfully, firms have (apart from the realisation
of possible synergies and other benefits) an additional incentive to merge.  Firms with a
larger market share are better able to manipulate the government.  Second, one can expect
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that manipulation of government policy is strongest and hence the distortionary side
effects of policy are most severe in very concentrated industries.  Hence, our analysis
points to further reasons why merger regulation and an effective anti-trust policy are
socially beneficial.
7. Concluding remarks
So, what are the policy lessons one should draw from our analysis?  First, our model
suggests that the policies of a government with short-run commitment power only, may
be fully successful, but –perhaps paradoxically- only if implemented in a business
environment that is very uncertain and in which investors value flexibility highly.
Although real-world policy making in a climate of uncertainty involves many difficulties,
we showed that one possible problem policy makers face, that is, the exploitation of
short-run policy commitment power by firms, is likely to be lessened by uncertainty.
This is good news for (non-corrupt) governments in less developed countries, especially
in newly emerging economies and economies in transition, in which the market place is
fraught with uncertainty and firms are keen to adopt a wait-and-see approach to
investment.  However, it is bad news for most governments in highly developed
countries, in which the economic climate tends to be –at least most of the time- more
certain.  In those circumstances, firm are more likely to invest earlier in order to
manipulate government policy strategically.  Then, policy schemes that correct the initial
distortion may make things worse by creating a new and more harmful one.
Second, policy manipulation by private agents is a far wider problem than one might
suspect.  It is well known that “soft” or “weak” states, referring to governments whose
objective function is contaminated by political interests, are vulnerable to manipulation
by private agents.  Our analysis shows that even the policies of “hard” or “strong” states,
i.e. governments that are benevolent pure welfare maximisers, may not remain insulated
from private agents’ manipulation if they lack the ability to commit to their policies long-
term.
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Third, policy intervention is likely to do most damage in heavily concentrated industries.
In those sectors, individual firms not only have more market power, they also have a
stronger ability and thus a stronger incentive to manipulate policy.  This suggests that
countries that adhere to a rigorous competition policy may be able to implement tax and
subsidy policies more effectively.
Finally, in practice there exists a serious danger that policies are evaluated as being
successful, while they are in fact causing harm.  Especially when the policy corrects the
targeted distortion, the policy manipulating activities that generate new distortions may
be easily overlooked, particularly when these do not involve directly unproductive rent-
seeking behaviour, such as lobbying.  So, the side effects of policy intervention by
governments with limited commitment power may remain undetected, which makes
policy activism all the more dangerous.
Appendix A
If the firm invests early, the government sets the subsidy after the firm chooses k;
Q
es G=  (see expression (10)) with )(QQQ G=G .  Since Q is chosen in the final stage (see
expression (5)), we have ),,( uskQQ =  with
 QQQkkQ pp /-= , QQQssQ pp /-=  and QQQuuQ pp /-= .  (A.1)
Second-order conditions for the firm require 0<-= QQQQQQ CRp ; furthermore,
0>-= QkQk Cp , 1=Qsp  and 0>= QuQu Rp .  Using (A.1), 1=Qsp , 0=Qp  and Qs G= ,
total differentiation of the first-order condition for es  yields:
0)( =
ú
ú
û
ù
ê
ê
ë
é
+÷
÷
ø
ö
ç
ç
è
æ +
G+-
ds
dQ
dk
dsdk
Qk
QQ
QsQk
QQQQ pp
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p , which implies 
QQQQQQ
QkQQ
e
CR
C
dk
ds
G+-
G
=
(see expression (13)).
Appendix B
Proof of proposition 2:
Part (i) – The proof requires showing that the equilibrium with early investment in ),( sk -
space lies above and to the right of the one with investment delay (as depicted in Figure
22
2a).  We know that, along )(sk  (the firm’s capital reaction function) the firm chooses –
given s- its optimal, i.e. cost-minimising, k ( 0=kC ).  Since 0>sQ  (see expression
(A.1)), )(sk  must be upward sloping (starting at any point on )(sk  and keeping k
constant, an increase in s implies an output increase, and since 0<= kQQk CC  an increase
in Q pushes kC  below zero; hence –since 0>kkC - k must rise to reach the new cost-
minimising point for the higher output level).  Thus, below )(sk , k is below )(min Qk  and
hence 0<kC ; above )(sk , k is above )(
min Qk  and hence 0>kC .
Since dk  is chosen such that 0=kC  (see expression (6)), 
dk  lies on )(sk , and since
Q
ds G=  (see expression (8)), ds  lies on )(ks .  Hence, the equilibrium when the firm
delays lies at the intersection of )(ks  and )(sk .  Because )(ks  cuts )(sk  only once, the
equilibrium is unique (see point d in Figure 2a). With early investment, Q
es G=  (see
expression (10)), implying that es  also lies on )(ks .  However, from expressions (12)
and (13) we know that at certainty 0>kC  when 0>GQQ .  Given that G  is strictly
convex, )(ks  is monotonically increasing and cuts )(sk  from below.  Hence, the
equilibrium when the firm invests early (point e in Figure 2a) lies above and to the right
of the equilibrium when the firm delays (point d), implying de kk >  and de ss > .
The proofs for part (ii) and part (iii) are analogous.
Proof of proposition 3:
Irrespective of the firm’s investment timing, the subsidy is always chosen such that
Qs G=  and hence both the equilibrium with delay and the one with early investment lie
along )(ks .  If the firm invests early, it can choose dk , implying the pair ),( dd sk .
However, it chooses ek  instead (with de kk ¹  if 0¹GQQ ), implying the pair ),(
ee sk .
This must imply de pp ³  at 02 =s .
Appendix C
[Table A.1 about here]
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Figure 1: The game
      t=1
Uncertainty Stage 1: Firm chooses whether to invest now or in t=2; if firm chooses
to invest now, it determines its investment level.   
     t=2              Stage 2: Government sets output subsidy.     
Certainty
Stage 3: · If firm delayed investment (in stage 1), it determines its
   investment level;
· Firm chooses output.  
Figure 2a: Early investment versus investment delay under
the policy regime at certainty: GQ>0 and GQQ>0
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Figure 2b: Early investment versus investment delay under
the policy regime at certainty: GQ<0 and GQQ<0
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Figure 3b: Policy intervention versus laissez faire
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Note: Strictly speaking      is only defined at h >0; h = 0 is ruled out since at that
point k would be zero.
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Figure 4a: Duopoly - Investment timing under laissez faire 
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Figure 4b: Duopoly – Investment timing under policy intervention
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Figure 4c: Duopoly - Policy intervention versus laissez 
faire (e0=0, e=1)
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Table A.1: Laissez-faire versus the policy regime with a monopolist firm with uQap +-= , rkQkcC +-= )( 0 q and 
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